Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Imagination, philosophy: imaginations are mental representations of non-present situations, events, states, sensory perceptions, experiences with certain characteristics, tones, sound sequences, sounds, noises, voices, smells, heat, coldness etc. The imagination of something undefined is not possible. Understanding a sentence can create an idea of the corresponding situation or image. See also representations past, future, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Stephen M. Kosslyn on Imagination - Dictionary of Arguments
I 253 Pylyshyn: Problem: internal knowledge representation. Vs Visual ideas as a qualitatively independent or theoretically adequate form of mental representation. >Representation, >Knowledge representation. Imagination, visual/Kosslyn: Question: do they differ from other conceptions in structure and function? I 253 Interpretation: we are never aware of having to interpret imaginary images. There are no incomplete ideas, for example that half a sofa is missing. But too much storage capacity would be necessary to store all the information from the retina. I 256 Besides, there would be no practical access if all of them were stored. So there must be some interpretation. >Interpretation. Pictorial ideas are never necessarily true. (In contrast to some propositions). >Necessity, >Logical truth, >Truth. Visual imagination/Kosslyn: mere having does not imply that there is a causal role here. >Causality, >Causal role. I 260 Thesis: Our perception consists of parts assigned to objects. KosslynVsPylyshyn: we do have imaginary images. Even if they are not scanned internally. If the images are saved uninterpreted, you do not need too much time to access them. I 253 Imagination/visual imagination/image/picture/Kosslyn/Pomerantz: Interpretation: we are never aware of the need to interpret mental images. There are no incomplete ideas about e.g. that the half of a sofa is lacking. There would be no practical access, if all imaginations were saved. So there must be some interpretation. I 257 Pylyshyn Thesis: there must be a third code between language and visual presentation - problem: that is uneconomical. Stephen M. Kosslyn/James R. Pomerantz, Imagery, Propositions and the Form of Internal Representations”, Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kosslyn I Stephen M. Kosslyn James R. Pomerantz "Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations", in: Cognitive Psychology 9 (1977), 52-76 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 |
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> Counter arguments against Kosslyn
> Counter arguments in relation to Imagination
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27